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EPIC GAMES V. APPLE: TECH-TYING AND THE 
FUTURE OF ANTITRUST* 
Emma C. Smizer† 
Antitrust and “Big Tech” firms are under renewed scrutiny, in part due 
to the dispute between Epic Games and Apple.  This lawsuit strikes at the 
heart of the growing phenomenon of “tech-tying,” a form of vertical integra-
tion in digital aftermarkets where monopolistic tech firms condition the use 
of their operating systems on the added use of other complimentary software 
or services.  Judicial attitude toward claims of tying has shifted considerably 
over recent decades, resulting in lax enforcement against vertical integration 
arrangements.  This Comment argues that Apple’s conduct constitutes “tech-
tying” and that competitors should be permitted to enter the aftermarkets of 
both iOS app distribution and iOS in-app payments processing.  Antitrust 
laws must evolve from its industrial-era origins to account for today’s high-
tech industry by expanding to protect competition. 
  
                                                          
*Although the printing process will result in this Comment being published after the May 2021 Epic 
Games v. Apple bench trial in the Northern District of California, the Comment was finalized prior 
to the trial.  The analysis in this Comment will remain relevant to issues likely to be considered on 
appeal in this case and parallel issues likely to arise in other cases. 
† J.D. Candidate at Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School, Class of 2022.  The author 
would like to thank Professor Lauren Willis, Associate Dean for Research at Loyola Law School, 
for her invaluable feedback and exhaustive editing.  The author would also like to thank David 
Kesselman, Professor of Antitrust Law at Loyola Law School, for being generous with his time and 
insights.  She would like to express her gratitude to the staff and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles 
Entertainment Law Review for their assistance and patience.  Lastly, the author would like to thank 
her friends and family who listened, nodded, and looked interested. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On the afternoon of July 29, 2020, Tim Cook raised his right hand and 
swore his testimony would be true and correct, so help him, God.1  In his 
opening statement before the Congressional antitrust hearings, Cook asserted 
that Apple users give the iPhone a “99% satisfaction rating,” even while fac-
ing “fierce competition” in the smartphone market.2  “We do not have a dom-
inant share in any market or any product category where we do business,” 
claimed Cook.3  Yet in 2019, Apple earned 66% of the global profit share in 
the handset market.4  Cook also stated that app developers do not pay for any 
metaphorical “shelf space” in the iOS App Store, despite charging a 30% fee 
to developers on any purchases made through the App Store.5  Shortly after 
the close of these hearings, Apple became the world’s most valuable publicly 
traded company, reaching a $2 trillion market cap.6 
Antitrust has been thrust into the spotlight yet again as the United States 
government grapples with whether these tech giants have unfairly dominated 
the market.  In light of the hearings, Congress released a “blockbuster” anti-
trust report in October 2020, with more than 440 pages devoted to criticizing 
the business practices of big tech companies, including Apple, and suggest-
ing a new path for antitrust laws.7  The House Subcommittee on Antitrust 
                                                          
1. CNET, Google, Apple, and ALL the Tech Billionaires Fight Antitrust Against Congress 
(full hearing), YOUTUBE (July 29, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ht-zdeMwxbw&ab
_channel=CNET [https://perma.cc/4G5Q-732F].  
2. Id.  
3. Id.  
4. William Gallagher, Apple Earned 66% of the Entire Smartphone Market’s Profits in 




5. CNET, supra note 1; Jack Nicas et al., Fortnite Creator Sues Apple and Google After 
Ban From App Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/technol-
ogy/apple-fortnite-ban.html [https://perma.cc/A5X2-U75H].  
6. Sergei Klebnikov, Apple Becomes First U.S. Company Worth More Than $2 Trillion, 
FORBES (Aug. 19, 2020, 3:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2020/08/19/ap-
ple-becomes-first-us-company-worth-more-than-2-trillion/#5435c2bc66e6 [perma.cc/A3F8-
P86W].  
7. Adi Robertson & Russell Brandom, Congress Releases Blockbuster Tech Antitrust Re-
port, VERGE (Oct. 6, 2020, 4:53 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/10/6/21504814/congress-
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expressed concerns over Apple’s “durable” market power, maintained 
through “high switching costs, ecosystem lock-in, and brand loyalty.”8  The 
report goes on to suggest various solutions, such as “reasserting the original 
intent” of antitrust laws to include protection for “not just consumers, but 
also workers, entrepreneurs, independent businesses, open markets, a fair 
economy, and democratic ideals.”9 
In August 2020, Apple faced renewed scrutiny in a lawsuit brought by 
video-game developer, Epic Games, Inc. (“Epic”) in the Northern District 
Court of California.10  Earlier that month, Epic violated Apple’s terms of 
service when Epic permitted its users to bypass Apple’s internal payment 
processing mechanism, In-App Purchase (“IAP”), by using their own direct 
payment system.11  Epic gave a 20% discount to customers who used its own 
direct payment system and asserted that this change in price reflected poten-
tial consumer savings if Epic was no longer required to give 30% of its earn-
ings on in-app purchases to Apple.12  Apple promptly removed Fortnite from 
the iOS App Store, triggering a carefully constructed media campaign from 
Epic that mimicked Apple’s own advertisement homage to the dystopian fu-
ture portrayed in George Orwell’s 1984.13  Epic’s campaign video tracks 
Apple’s own commercial nearly frame-for-frame, making an explicit sug-
gestion that Apple has now become the dystopic autocrat.14  The two tech 
                                                          
antitrust-report-house-judiciary-committee-apple-google-amazon-facebook [https://perma.cc
/9SMK-WEZ7].  
8. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 334 (Comm. 
Print 2020).  
9. Id. at 392.  
10. Nicas et al., supra note 5.  
11. Id.  
12. Complaint at 7, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
13, 2020), 2020 WL 5073937.  
13. The Fortnite Team, #FreeFortnite, EPIC GAMES (Nov. 17, 2020), https://
www.epicgames.com/fortnite/en-US/news/freefortnite [https://perma.cc/WEB4-9F4L]; Reuters 
Staff, Apple’s Famous ‘1984’ Video Parodied by Fortnite Game Maker, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2020, 
3:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-epic-games-1984/apples-famous-1984-video-
parodied-by-fortnite-game-maker-idUSKCN25935X [https://perma.cc/4MAE-MGUZ].  
14. Reuters Staff, supra note 13.  
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companies have since locked horns in the courts, with Epic filing its com-
plaint for antitrust violations against Apple.15 
In its complaint, Epic alleged that Apple has created an illegal “tying” 
arrangement by linking the use of its smartphones to both its App Store and 
subsequently Apple’s IAP system.16  To understand how #FreeFortnite be-
gan trending on Twitter, it is important to examine how the U.S. antitrust 
jurisprudence led us here, and how the Northern District’s decision is leading 
us forward.   
This Comment focuses on the inconsistent treatment of tying claims by 
U.S. courts17 and the issue of tying presented in Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, 
Inc.  Part II defines tying arrangements and examines the relationship be-
tween tying and market power.  Part II then explores the subtle distinction 
between conduct judged under per se and rule of reason standards.  The U.S. 
government and its courts have a complex, and often contradictory, relation-
ship with antitrust laws, undergoing a gradual yet dramatic shift adjudicating 
claims of tying.  Part III expands upon the instant case, Epic Games v. Apple, 
and explains what arguments may propel Epic’s case forward.  Part III addi-
tionally compares Epic Games v. Apple with two watershed decisions deal-
ing with tying and bundling in digital markets.  Part IV argues that Apple’s 
conduct constitutes an illegal tying arrangement which has and continues to 
unreasonably restrain virtual trade.  Part IV also assesses how Apple’s con-
duct is effective through its significant leverage in iOS aftermarkets and 
lacks any legitimate procompetitive justifications that may challenge Epic’s 
tying claims. 
The antitrust laws of the early 20th century must be construed to protect 
competition in order to promote a healthy, functioning economy.  Therefore, 
this Comment suggests that the scope of antitrust laws should be expanded 
to protect small businesses, entrepreneurs, and workers, rather than focus 
solely on consumer welfare.  With an estimated value of $17.3 billion, Epic 
is not a small business18—yet the principles the company seeks to vindicate 
                                                          
15. The Fortnite Team, supra note 13.  
16. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 57.  
17. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND 
ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 5.02 (Carolina Acad. Press 7th ed. 2019).  
18. Ryan Browne, Fortnite Creator Epic Games is Now Valued at $17.3 Billion After 
Blockbuster Funding Deal, CNBC (Aug. 6, 2020, 10:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/06
/fortnite-creator-epic-games-is-now-valued-at-17point3-billion.html [https://perma.cc/5VKS-
ZGDY].  
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could benefit many small players that otherwise would not be willing or able 
to shoulder such costly litigation.  This Comment posits that, in the case of 
Epic Games v. Apple, Apple’s conduct constitutes illicit “tech-tying” and 
thus, Apple’s control in the aftermarkets of both iOS app distribution and in-
app payments processing must be limited.   
II. BACKGROUND 
In the early 20th century, capitalism flourished in the United States, 
virtually unfettered by the budding attempts at antitrust regulation.19  Alt-
hough robust antitrust enforcement briefly followed this period of economic 
growth, judicial attitude toward antitrust laws has fluctuated considerably 
over the past century.20  Antitrust laws generally prohibit firms with market 
power from engaging in anticompetitive conduct, such as creating vertical 
restraints or tying agreements, the practice of controlling distinct links within 
the production or distribution chain.21  The doctrine of tying has experienced 
“the greatest change in the last 50 years” when compared to other areas of 
antitrust law.22  Courts judge claims of antitrust violations under either per 
se illegality or the rule of reason standard, but these analyses have a unique 
relationship to tying arrangements.23  The following subsections define these 
relevant terms dealing with tying arrangements in antitrust laws and expand 
upon the varying treatment of tying claims by the courts through history into 
the modern era. 
A. Tying and Market Power Defined 
Tying occurs when a party sells one product, known as the “tying” 
product, with the added condition that the consumer also purchase a separate 
                                                          
19. Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antirust 
Movement, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirth-
of-the-u-s-antitrust-movement [https://perma.cc/9TRZ-VVN4].  
20. Id.  
21. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.01.  
22. Id.  
23. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurispru-
dence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1248–49 (2008).  
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or “tied” product.24  In effect, the buyer cannot purchase the first good or 
service without also purchasing or utilizing the second good or service from 
the seller.25  Tying arrangements are a form of vertical restraint where one 
firm creates interdependent agreements between markets, for example, by 
conditioning the purchase of a lamp with the added condition of also buying 
a lamp shade from the same firm.26  In the case of tying, one firm may fore-
close inter-brand competition by bundling certain tied goods or services with 
the tying product.27   
The practice of tying “undermines competition on the merits by ena-
bling a firm with market power in one market to privilege products or ser-
vices in a distinct market.”28  Federal law attempts to prevent anticompetitive 
conduct by prohibiting firms with sufficient market power from exploiting 
these vertical restraints.29  However, not all tying arrangements are illegal30 
and vertical restraints are generally considered less inherently anticompeti-
tive, making it difficult for claimants to prevail on claims of tying.31  Further, 
as a prerequisite, claimants must also establish that the defendant possesses 
sufficient market power in the tying product market.32 
A firm’s market power is essential to tying claims.33  A firm must have 
“appreciable economic power” within the tying product market, otherwise 
                                                          
24. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.01.  
25. Id.  
26. Id.  
27. Id. at 37–38.  
28. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 398.  
29. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02; Scott Mah et. al., Antitrust Vio-
lations, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 413, 422 (2020).  
30. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 (1984) (“It is clear, however, 
that not every refusal to sell two products separately can be said to restrain competition.”).  
31. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.01.  
32. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
33. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) (“Our cases have 
concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s ex-
ploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product 
that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different 
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consumers face little pressure to purchase the firm’s tied products.34  Courts 
define “market power” as a firm’s capacity to raise prices above competitive 
levels or to exclude competition.35  Market power can often be inferred by a 
firm’s “possession of a predominant share of the market”36 or through more 
precise mathematic formulas.37  Determining market power also requires de-
fining the relevant product and the geographic market.38  For example, a firm 
may possess market power domestically in the U.S. but lack the same power 
worldwide.39  Further, courts have recognized that a single product may pro-
vide its own relevant market for antitrust purposes within a secondary market 
for parts or services.40  After proving market power, claimants must then 
fulfil specific elements of tying claims to prevail. 
B. Per Se Illegality and its Misleading Relationship to Tying 
American jurisprudence has carved two distinct and well-worn paths 
of antitrust analyses: per se illegality and conduct judged under the “rule of 
reason” standard.41  The per se approach applies to conduct that, on its face, 
has such a detrimental effect on competition that it is presumed to violate 
antitrust laws without the need for a robust inquiry into the alleged harm.42  
To improve judicial efficiency and economy, courts use the per se categorical 
                                                          
terms.  When such ‘forcing’ is present, competition on the merits in the market for the tied item is 
restrained and the Sherman Act is violated.”); see also Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 
101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The core element of a monopolization claim is market power, which is 
defined as “the ability to raise price by restricting output.”).  
34. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992).  
35. United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).  
36. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464.  
37. E.g., SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 2.06.  
38. Id.  
39. See id.  
40. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 2.06; see also Eastman Kodak Co., 
504 U.S. at 471.  
41. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1212.  
42. Id. at 1213–14.  
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approach for “manifestly anticompetitive”43 conduct and are not concerned 
with a fact-driven analysis of a firm’s actions or possible competitive justi-
fications.44   
To further complicate matters, the application of per se analysis to 
claims of tying dramatically departs from the typical categorical approach of 
other antitrust claims.45  The approach of per se tying sets a high threshold 
for parties seeking redress, requiring a claimant to prove: (1) the tied prod-
ucts are two separate products, (2) the defendant has sufficient market power 
in the market of the tied product, (3) the defendant affords the consumer no 
choice but to purchase the tied product, and (4) a substantial amount of com-
merce is foreclosed by the tied product.46  Unlike “true” or typical per se 
scenarios that are resolved without any in-depth factual inquiry,47 a claimant 
must prove these elements to prevail on a claim of per se tying.48  Further, 
per se defendants are not normally allowed to argue any “business rationales 
which validate their conduct.”49  Yet, courts generally tend to resolve claims 
of antitrust violations under the rule of reason analysis which, in contrast to 
per se illegality, relies heavily upon an ad-hoc analysis of whether the alleged 
conduct unreasonably restricts trade.50   
Therefore, per se tying is only nominally per se because it requires a 
factual inquiry to adjudicate tying claims.51  If a plaintiff cannot prove all 
four elements of per se tying, they may still recover under the rule of reason 
                                                          
43. Gary Myers, Tying Arrangements and the Computer Industry: Digidyne Corp. v. Data 
General Corp., 1985 DUKE L.J. 1027, 1028 (1985).  
44. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1213–14.  
45. Id. at 1217.  
46. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Lemley & 
Leslie, supra note 23, at 1249.  
47. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1249.  
48. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
49. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1249.  
50. Id. at 1214–15 (“The vast majority of trade-restraint categories receive rule of reason 
treatment. In contrast to the per se rule, which eschews in-depth investigation, in rule of reason 
cases ‘the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive 
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.’”).  
51. Id. at 1249.  
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standard, though this is not typically a “promising alternative.”52  Here, Epic 
pled in the alternative that Apple’s conduct should be judged under the rule 
of reason standard.53 
C. Rule of Reason Tying 
The delineation between per se and rule of reason analysis blurs signif-
icantly when applied to claims of tying.54  Courts continue to use the per se 
label when adjudicating tying claims but have modified per se tying by add-
ing elements that strongly resemble the typical rule of reason standard.55  
While claimants must still prove the same elements of per se tying in alleging 
rule of reason tying, there is one important distinction:  Courts must also 
weigh the procompetitive benefits of the defendant’s conduct against the po-
tential for anticompetitive harm.56  In cases involving tying, the rule of rea-
son standard allows courts to measure the potentially chilling effect on inno-
vation against actual anticompetitive effects within the market at issue.57   
Thus, tying claims evaluated under the rule of reason standard are often 
dismissed on the grounds that the claimant has failed to demonstrate a “sig-
nificant anticompetitive effect” caused by the defendant’s conduct.58  When 
dealing with digital markets, courts may be reticent to use the per se label, 
and instead opt to apply the rule of reason standard.59  However, for claims 
of tying, no clear preference between per se and rule of reason analysis exists 
                                                          
52. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
53. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 54.  
54. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02 (“Given the Court’s more recent 
tying decisions there is a question of whether tying has finally slipped from a ‘soft’ per se to a rule 
of reason analysis. At this point it appears that it has not, at least not quite.”); Lemley & Leslie, 
supra note 23, at 1250 (“While it may seem of no moment whether tie-ins are called per se illegal 
so long as they are evaluated under their own modified rule of reason, the miscategorization of 
tying arrangements has consequences.”).  
55. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1250.  
56. Id. at 1251. 
57. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
58. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1251.  
59. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1500–02 
(2019).  
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where digital markets are implicated,60 perhaps in part due to the “ill-
placed”61 label of per se.  The future of tying law remains unclear as the 
amorphous category of per se tying shifts ever closer to resemble rule of 
reason tying.62 
D. The Development of Tying Jurisprudence 
Judicial enforcement of antitrust laws against tying arrangements has 
waxed and waned markedly throughout the past century.63  The Sherman 
Act, enacted in 1890, was designed to impede companies from monopolizing 
their respective markets and undermining competition.64  Only two sentences 
long, section 1 of the Sherman Act explicitly outlaws any “contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy” that restricts or re-
strains trade either among states or internationally.65  Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act further outlaws any actual monopolization, attempted 
monopolization, and conspiracy between parties to monopolize trade.66  In 
1914, the U.S. government strengthened its antitrust laws through the Clay-
ton Act, supplementing the Sherman Act by prohibiting specific anticompet-
itive behavior.67  Similarly, the California Cartwright Act also prohibits 
trusts, which are defined as a “combination of capital, skill or acts by two or 
more persons” that restrict or limit commerce.68  Yet, courts have been 
                                                          
60. Id. at 1499–500 (“No explicitly different rules for digital markets emerged in subse-
quent years, and there is widespread agreement that none are needed.  Of course, analysts continue 
to take the unique characteristics of each relevant market into account on a case-by-case basis.  But 
the rules themselves do not (in theory, at least) vary based on the type of market at issue.”).  
61. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1250.  
62. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
63. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19, at 2.  
64. Id. at 3.  
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).  
66. Id.  
67. Gregory T. Jenkins & Robert W. Bing, Abstract, Microsoft’s Monopoly: Anti-Compet-
itive Behavior, Predatory Tactics, And The Failure Of Governmental Will, 5 J. BUS. & ECON. 
RESEARCH 11, 12 (2007).  
68. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (1941).  
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reluctant to enforce these antitrust laws69 as judicial attitude toward tying 
arrangements has changed considerably over the years.70 
In 1936, the Supreme Court found illicit tying where IBM conditioned 
the leasing of its machines on the added lease of its tabulating cards, because 
IBM’s conduct “substantially lessened competition,” and thus violated sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act.71  In International Salt Company v. United States, 
the Supreme Court went on to strengthen its position on tying arrangements 
in 1947 when it affirmed summary judgment against a salt machine manu-
facturer for tying the use of its patented machines to the purchase of its own 
salt product.72  The International Salt Company court held that it was “un-
reasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market.”73  
Again in 1958, the Supreme Court found that the North Pacific Railway 
Company had violated antitrust laws by conditioning the leasing of its land 
upon the lessee’s use of North Pacific for all shipping needs.74  Here, the 
Court clarified that tying arrangements are “unreasonable in and of them-
selves” when a firm has “sufficient economic power” to “appreciably restrain 
free competition in the market for the tied product.”75 
However, antitrust enforcement experienced a marked decline by the 
late 1970s,76 preceded by the 1969 Supreme Court decision in Fortner En-
terprises v. United States Steel (“Fortner I”).77  The issue before the Fortner 
I court was whether tying credit toward the purchase of land to the condition 
of building prefabricated homes created by the lender’s parent company 
                                                          
69. Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 569, 577 (2004).  
70. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
71. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936).  
72. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 402 (1947).  
73. Id. at 396.  
74. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).  
75. Id. at 6.  
76. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.  
77. Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).  
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violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.78  The Court reversed summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant and remanded to resolve the issue of market 
power.79  Fortner I effectively reasserted the necessity of market power in 
the tying product market as a prerequisite to prevail on claims of tying.80  
Eight years later, the Supreme Court returned to this issue in Fortner II, hold-
ing the evidence did not support the assertion that the defendant possessed 
sufficient market power in the credit market.81 
In 1984, the Supreme Court dealt with tying again when an anesthesi-
ologist brought suit against Jefferson Hospital for contracting exclusively 
with an anesthesiologist firm, thus conditioning the use of its hospital ser-
vices to the anesthesiologic services.82  The Supreme Court reversed the Cir-
cuit decision, which initially had found the agreement to be per se tying, and 
indicated in its holding that 30% market share would not constitute market 
power for the purposes of per se tying.83  In Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, 
she argued that “[t]he time has therefore come to abandon the “per se” label,” 
urging the court to instead examine the potential anticompetitive effects of a 
defendant’s conduct rather than outright condemn such vertical restraints.84  
However, the majority of Court asserted it was “far too late” in the history 
of the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence to treat tying arrangements as anything 
but per se illegal, and thus kept the per se label despite adopting rule of rea-
son elements.85 
The Fortner and Jefferson Hospital cases were part of a broader ideo-
logical shift toward “self-correcting markets” and away from prohibiting 
                                                          
78. Id. at 497; see also SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
79. Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 505–07.  
80. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
81. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02; see also United States Steel Corp. v. 
Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).  
82. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 5 (1984); see also SULLIVAN & 
HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
83. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 26; see also SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
84. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, concurring).  
85. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 23, at 1249–50.  
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vertical restraints.86  The prevailing theory at this time posited there was no 
need for additional antitrust enforcement to “maintain the conditions neces-
sary” for competition; rather, these markets would naturally self-regulate 
even with the emergence of monopoly powers.87 
E. Antitrust in the Modern Era 
Antitrust laws were written at a time when technology was still under-
going rapid development.  Critics of antitrust regulation in the technology 
sector suggest that the “pace of technological change is so swift . . . no firm 
can hold monopoly power in a high technology market for a meaningful pe-
riod.”88  Courts have also established a “confusing and inconsistent standard” 
when applying antitrust laws to the high technology industry and digital mar-
kets.89  This lack of consistent antitrust enforcement could deter new com-
panies from entering certain technological markets due to the “exclusionary 
conduct” from “individual firms with monopoly power.”90  Today, the U.S. 
continues to grapple with free-market dogma and its competing antitrust in-
terests under increasingly outdated laws.91 
In 2006, the Supreme Court returned to the antitrust doctrine of tying 
when a defendant tied its unpatented ink to the use of its patented printheads 
and ink containers.92  In its opinion, the Court openly observed that “[o]ver 
the years, this Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substan-
tially diminished[,]” solidifying the marked departure of American courts 
from past years of antitrust regulation.93  The Court clarified that the 
                                                          
86. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19; see generally SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, 
at § 5.02.   
87. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.  
88. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Article, A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology 
Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 70 (2002).  
89. Id. at 72.  
90. Id.  
91. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8.  
92. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31–32 (2006); see also SULLIVAN 
& HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
93. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 35.  
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application of so-called per se tying would only extend to instances where 
there is a “probability of anticompetitive consequences.”94 
In the modern era of antitrust, government regulation has ebbed signif-
icantly, continuing to rely on a “distorted” belief of self-correcting markets.95  
Recently, in 2019, Apple CEO Tim Cook disclosed that Apple bought twenty 
to twenty-five smaller businesses over a six-month period and, on average, 
Apple acquires a new company every two to three weeks.96  Nonetheless, 
Apple tends to purchase smaller companies, perhaps avoiding large acquisi-
tions that may draw unwanted government attention.97 
The sheer dominance of tech companies may finally be motivating a 
shift back to a “progressive, anti-monopoly, New Brandeis School” approach 
to antitrust regulation.98  In February 2020, the Federal Trade Commission 
announced it would require Apple and other tech giants to “provide infor-
mation about prior acquisitions not reported to the antitrust agencies” dating 
back ten years.99  The U.S. Department of Justice also recently filed an anti-
trust lawsuit against Google in what has been described as the “most aggres-
sive U.S. legal challenge” in more than two decades.100  Antitrust regulation 
may be especially needed in digital markets where “a few key gatekeepers” 
maintain a vice-like grip on the industry, making it “hard, if not impossible,” 
for entrants to compete with these “dominant super-platforms.”101  The 
House Subcommittee on Antitrust recommends in its recent report that the 
legislature reassert that “conditioning access to a product or service in which 
                                                          
94. Id. at 37.  
95. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.  
96. Lauren Feiner, Apple Buys a Company Every Few Weeks, Says CEO Tim Cook, CNBC 
(May 6, 2019, 8:59 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/06/apple-buys-a-company-every-few-
weeks-says-ceo-tim-cook.html [https://perma.cc/XF4T-45K2]. 
97. Id.  
98. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.  
99. FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions by Large Technology Companies, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N., (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-examine-
past-acquisitions-large-technology-companies [https://perma.cc/57WX-5YP6].  
100. Brent Kendall & Rob Copeland, Justice Department Hits Google With Antitrust Law-
suit, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 20, 2020, 8:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-to-
file-long-awaited-antitrust-suit-against-google-11603195203 [https://perma.cc/4LN8-CQUM].  
101. Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 19.  
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a firm has market power to the purchase or use of a separate product or ser-
vice is anticompetitive.”102  This mounting scrutiny may ultimately play out 
in Epic’s favor as the courts and legislature move toward a new age of anti-
trust enforcement against such “Big Tech” giants.  As the jurisprudence of 
tying stands now, the definition of the tying product market may be outcome-
determinative for Epic’s success or failure. 
III. TECH-TYING IN DIGITAL AFTERMARKETS 
On August 13, 2020, Epic Games, Inc. filed its complaint against Ap-
ple, alleging Apple engaged in anti-competitive conduct and thus violated 
both California state and federal law by exerting monopolistic control over 
the iOS app distribution market and the in-app payment processing mar-
ket.103  The lawsuit came after Apple removed Fortnite, Epic’s popular bat-
tle-royal game, from its App Store for violating Apple’s terms of service by 
offering a payment system that bypassed Apple’s IAP system.104  Epic’s law-
suit alleged a total of ten counts against Apple, with six originating from the 
Sherman Act and three violations of California’s Cartwright Act.105  At the 
heart of Epic’s lawsuit is the complex issue of tying in digital markets, rais-
ing important questions as to how antitrust in the modern era should be con-
strued.106 
                                                          
102. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 398.  
103. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 44–60.  
104. Nicas et al., supra note 5.  
105. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 44–61.  
106. Steven Pearlstein, Beating Up on Big Tech is Fun and Easy. Restraining it Will Re-
quire Rewriting the Law, WASH. POST (July 30, 2020, 9:48 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/2020/07/30/antitrust-amazon-apple-facebook-google [https://perma.cc/49WT-UUPG]; 
Ian Sherr, Apple’s Battle With Epic Games Could Lead to Big Changes in iPhone Apps, CNET 
(Sept. 27, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apples-battle-with-epic-games-could-lead-
to-big-changes-in-iphone-apps/ [https://perma.cc/4K78-24Z6].  
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A. Mobile Operating Systems and App Store Mechanics 
Mobile devices, such as iPhones and Androids, use mobile application 
stores (“app stores”) to distribute software applications (“apps”).107  These 
app stores allow users to browse various apps, install compatible apps, and 
view or leave feedback on an app’s performance.108  For third-party app de-
velopers, app stores are the primary or sole means of distribution for their 
apps.  Each app store dictates which apps are permitted, how app users pay 
for their in-app purchases of digital goods, and what distribution of that in-
app purchase’s revenue the app developer will receive.109  In addition, some 
apps charge a price for downloading the app itself or for subscribing to an 
app, and the app store determines what portion of the download or subscrip-
tion price the app developer will receive.110  Mobile device companies, such 
as Apple and Google, provide developers with the tools and support to build 
compatible apps for their respective mobile operating systems.111 
A device’s mobile operating system (“OS”), like Android or iOS, will 
determine which app store and apps are accessible to the user.112  For exam-
ple, a smartphone using Google’s Android OS will have access to the Google 
Play Store, the primary app store for Android devices, and other Android-
compatible app stores, such as Amazon’s Appstore, Aptoide, F-Droid, and 
the Samsung Galaxy Store.113  In contrast, Apple’s App Store is the only app 
store available for iOS smartphones.114  Additionally, an app designed for 
Android OS is not interoperable on Apple’s iOS; rather, an app developer 
                                                          
107. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 93.  
108. Id.  
109. Id.  
110. Id. at 339.  
111. Id. at 93.  
112. Id. at 94.  
113. Id. at 95.  
114. Id.  
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that wants its app to be available on both operating systems must create two 
identical apps which are compatible with each distinctive mobile OS.115 
When a user makes an in-app purchase for digital goods from an app, 
mobile app stores collect a “commission.”116  Apple and Google have created 
payment processing mechanisms linked to their app stores in order to collect 
this commission whenever in-app purchases occur.117  Yet, Apple and 
Google do not collect any commissions on physical goods sold through apps 
in their app stores.118  For example, a user may purchase physical shoes from 
an online retailer through an app on their mobile device.  This purchase 
would not be subject to any commission from the app store.  However, if a 
user purchases digital shoes for a virtual character through a mobile app, the 
app store charges the third-party app developer a commission on each digital 
goods sale.  Apple charges the app developer a commission of 30% on every 
in-app digital goods sale on Apple’s mobile devices.119 
B. Epic Games v. Apple  
In its complaint, Epic alleged that Apple requires all app developers to 
sign a contract where 30% of all in-app purchases of “digital goods and ser-
vices”120 must be paid to Apple.121  The contract also prohibits app develop-
ers from devising any way to skirt Apple’s IAP system122 and forbids devel-
opers from informing their iOS users that the app or its related digital goods 
                                                          
115. Id. at 94–95.  
116. Id. at 98.  
117. Id.  
118. Matthew Ball, Apple, Its Control Over the iPhone, the Internet, and the Metaverse, 
MATTHEWBALL.VC (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.matthewball.vc/all/applemetaverse [https://
perma.cc/94PN-4R6L]; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 98–99.  
119. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 98.  
120. Id. at 339.  
121. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 1.  
122. Id. at 1–2.  
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may be available for purchase at lower prices outside Apple’s App Store.123  
Apple also prohibits app developers from providing their iOS users with 
“links outside of the app that may lead users to find alternative subscription 
and payment methods.”124  Plainly, all purchases of digital goods made by 
iOS users must go through Apple, and Apple must be given its 30% com-
mission.125  If an app developer disagrees with these terms, they risk losing 
access to the nearly 1 billion global iOS user base.126  In its Answer to Epic’s 
Complaint, Apple painted a different picture, claiming Epic engaged in “sub-
terfuge” by uploading a “Trojan horse” version of Fortnite to the Apple App 
Store equipped with new “commission-theft functionality.”127 
Meanwhile, Epic argued that Apple, through its “dominant position in 
the mobile app store market and monopoly power over distribution of soft-
ware applications on iOS devices,”128 unlawfully tied the use of its iOS to 
the Apple App Store and subsequently the IAP system.129  In its Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Epic asserted that they seek only “the freedom not to 
use Apple’s App Store or IAP, and instead to use and offer competing ser-
vices.”130  Epic argued that software distribution should be “as open and 
competitive as it is on personal computers.”131  However, U.S. District Judge 
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers denied Epic’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
                                                          
123. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 339.  
124. Id.  
125. See generally Nicas et al., supra note 5; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. 
AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 339.  
126. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 3.  
127. Defendant and Counterclaimant Apple, Inc.’s Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims 
in Reply to Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 2, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, 
Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020).  
128. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.  
129. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 53.  
130. Plaintiff Epic Games, Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 3, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, 
Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020).  
131. Id. at 8.  
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to reinstate Fortnite in Apple’s App Store.132  Judge Rogers reasoned it 
would be unfair to reinstate Epic’s game after Epic willfully breached its 
contract with Apple.133  Both parties agreed to a bench trial, set to begin on 
May 3, 2021.134 
In its complaint, Epic alleged that Apple violates the Sherman Act by 
tying the use of its iOS mobile device software to Apple’s App Store, and 
thus to Apple’s IAP system.  Epic claimed that Apple possesses durable mar-
ket power and engages in exclusionary “gatekeeping” conduct in its iOS app 
distribution market and in-app payment processing market.135  Epic further 
argued that Apple’s conduct rises to the level of per se tying and pled, in the 
alternative, that Apple’s conduct violates the rule of reason standard of tying 
arrangements.136 
To prevail on its per se tying claim, Epic would need to establish the 
following: (1) the iOS system, the Apple App Store, and Apple’s IAP system 
are separate products; (2) Apple has sufficient market power in the markets 
of the tied products, iOS app distribution and iOS in-app payment pro-
cessing; (3) consumers have no choice but to use both Apple’s App Store 
and IAP system when using iOS mobile devices; and (4) Apple’s conduct 
forecloses a substantial amount of commerce by tying the iOS mobile de-
vices to the App Store, and thus to Apple’s IAP system.  In the alternative, 
under the rule of reason standard, Epic would not only need to satisfy the 
above elements, but also demonstrate that any procompetitive benefits are 
outweighed by anticompetitive harm from Apple’s tying arrangements.  
However, the question as to whether Apple possesses the requisite market 
                                                          
132. Order Granting In Part And Denying In Part Motion For Preliminary Injunction at 38, 
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020) (Epic’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction sought to both reinstate Fortnite in Apple’s App Store and protect access 
for Epic Affiliates’ developer accounts and tools, such as the Unreal Engine.  The Court denied 
Epic’s motion in part, deciding Fortnite would not be reinstated in Apple’s App Store, and granted 
in part Epic’s request to protect Epic Affiliates and enjoin Apple from taking any adverse action 
that would suspend, restrict or terminate with Epic Affiliates’ status in Apple’s Developer Pro-
gram.).  
133. Id. at 29–30.  
134. Case Scheduling and Pretrial Order at 2, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-
05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020).  
135. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.  
136. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 54.  
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power will be determined by how the market at issue is ultimately defined.  
To better understand Epic’s position, this case must be measured against two 
key watershed cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit 
Court, respectively, dealing with tying arrangements. 
C. Aftermarket Liability: The Kodak Decision 
When consumers buy equipment from an original equipment maker 
(“OEM”), a secondary market or “aftermarket” may be created for comple-
mentary parts or services for the equipment.137  By purchasing the original 
equipment, some consumers are locked into or dependent upon the OEM’s 
aftermarket for parts or service.138  The Jefferson Hospital court previously 
concluded that tying can also include “functionally linked products [where] 
at least one of which is useless without the other.”139  Essentially, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the defendant “tied the sale of the two products” and 
has “appreciable economic power in the tying market.”140 
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a landmark case dealing with 
tying, expanding antitrust liability into derivative aftermarkets.141  In East-
man Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services (“Kodak”), an independ-
ent service organization (“ISO”) brought suit against copy-machine manu-
facturer, Eastman Kodak, for enacting policies that made it more difficult for 
ISOs to compete with Kodak for servicing Kodak’s copying machine 
                                                          
137. Salil Kumar, Parts and Service Included: An Information-Centered Approach to Ko-
dak and the Problem of Aftermarket Monopolies, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1521, 1521 (1995) (“Durable 
goods ranging from farm machinery to computer hardware invariably require service, supplies, or 
replacement parts after their initial sale. The influence of original equipment makers (‘OEMs’) in 
the secondary market (or ‘aftermarket’) for such complementary goods has attracted recent legal 
attention.”).  
138. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.01.  “More recently, courts have been 
concerned with the issue of market power when buyers are arguably locked into a market by virtue 
of a prior purchase in a market in which the defendant did not have market power.”  Id.  
139.  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 463 (1992) (citing Jefferson 
Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 n.30 (1984)) (“We have often found arrangements 
involving functionally linked products at least one of which is useless without the other to be pro-
hibited tying devices.”).  
140. Id. at 462–64.  
141. Id. at 451.  
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equipment.142  First, the ISO plaintiff successfully argued that while the 
products and services were “functionally linked,” separate markets existed 
for each, similarly to separate markets existing for cameras and film, and 
computers and software.143  Second, the ISO plaintiff argued “Kodak has 
more than sufficient power in the parts market to force unwanted purchases 
of the tied market, service,” due to Kodak’s conduct of restricting the avail-
ability of parts and pressuring customers to use only Kodak servicing.144  The 
Court noted that a company possesses “market power” when it can “force a 
purchaser to do something [they] would not do in a competitive market.”145   
The Supreme Court agreed that Kodak possessed sufficient market 
power in the parts market to unlawfully influence the service aftermarket.146  
Further, the Court observed that, in theory, the extent to which a primary 
market influences the aftermarket “depends on the extent to which consum-
ers will change their consumption of one product in response to a price 
change in another,” known as the “‘cross-elasticity of demand.’”147  How-
ever, consumers may still continue to purchase products at a higher price and 
may not strictly follow this theoretical rule.148  Siding with the ISO plaintiff, 
the Supreme Court held that even a natural monopolist may not “exploit his 
dominant position in one market to expand his empire” into a derivative mar-
ket.149 
This case mirrors Epic’s suit against Apple in a number of ways.  Like 
the Kodak ISO, Epic took issue with Apple’s anticompetitive conduct of 
                                                          
142. Id.  
143. Id. at 463.  
144. Id. at 464–65.  
145. Id. at 489.  
146. Id. at 470.  
147. Id. at 469 (quoting United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 
400 (1956)).  
148. Id. at 474.  “Even if competitors had the relevant information, it is not clear that their 
interests would be advanced by providing such information to consumers. Moreover, even if con-
sumers were capable of acquiring and processing the complex body of information, they may 
choose not to do so.”  Id.  
149. Id. at 479 n.29 (quoting Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 
(1953)).  
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tying iOS mobile devices to both the App Store and Apple’s IAP system, 
effectively controlling both aftermarkets.150  Similar to the Court’s approach 
in Kodak, market definition will also be central to Epic’s case.  The Court 
rejected Kodak’s argument that by not possessing market power in the orig-
inal equipment market, Kodak customers could switch to competing prod-
ucts from other OEMs.151  Instead, the Court held that Kodak could raise 
prices within the parts and service aftermarkets without losing meaningful 
sales in the primary equipment market.152  This ability to maintain customers, 
the Court reasoned, was based on Kodak’s high switching costs imposed 
upon their customers by purchasing Kodak equipment, creating a “captive 
market” in Kodak’s parts and service aftermarkets.153  Here, Epic similarly 
argues the relevant tying product market is the aftermarket of iOS app distri-
bution, rather than mobile operating systems at large.154 
Apple, like Kodak, has perhaps found an “optimal price” where they 
may charge monopoly prices without “ruinous” consequences.155  Once a 
consumer purchases an iOS mobile device, they are effectively locked in to 
both Apple’s App Store and Apple’s IAP system to purchase any digital 
goods.156  Apple does not permit iOS mobile users to sideload apps.157  Fur-
thermore, consumers face “significant barriers” when switching their mobile 
devices, such as high costs, learning a new unfamiliar interface, and the dif-
ficulty of transferring data between devices.158  Switching costs remain high 
for iOS users because iOS and other compatible products are not available 
                                                          
150. See generally Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 
1–2.  
151. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
152. Id.  
153. Id.  
154. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 56.  
155. Eastman Kodak Co. v.  Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 470–71 (1992). 
156. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.  
157. Id. at 97.  
158. Id. at 102–03.  
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on non-iOS devices, resulting in product “lock-in” for iOS users.159  Apple’s 
smartphone pricing consistently soars above the global average selling price 
of smartphones, yet 91% of iOS users indicate they would continue to use 
Apple products.160  This is further evidenced by studies showing that 90% of 
iOS users remain with Apple when purchasing a new smartphone device, 
rather than switch to another operating system, such as Android.161  Unlike 
Kodak, Apple possesses between 50% and 60% of the U.S. market share of 
the mobile operating system market.162  In both the iOS app distribution mar-
ket and iOS in-app payment processing market, Apple effectively controls 
100% by prohibiting other means for consumers to download apps or make 
in-app purchases.163  Tackling a similar scenario of software bundling, the 
D.C. Circuit Court returned to the issue of aftermarket tying in digital mar-
ketplaces and came to a considerably different decision.164 
D. Bundling Products: The Microsoft Decision 
In 1998, the Department of Justice and twenty other states brought suit 
against Microsoft, alleging that Microsoft had violated antitrust laws by ty-
ing the web browser, Internet Explorer, to its Windows operating system.165  
In 2000, the trial court ruled that, as a consequence of violating the antitrust 
laws, Microsoft would be split into two companies—one for the Windows 
OS and one for its software applications.166  The Microsoft decision dealt 
with the then-novel issue of bundling an operating system with another sep-
arate software, a web browser.167   
                                                          
159. Id. at 102.  
160. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 43.  
161. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 102.  
162. Id.  
163. Id. at 97.  
164. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
165. Jenkins & Bing, supra note 67, at 12.  
166. Id. at 13–14.  
167. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 34.  
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Microsoft users received the Windows operating system with Internet 
Explorer pre-installed and were not allowed to uninstall it.168  Microsoft cus-
tomers demanded other web browsing options and the freedom to use a com-
peting internet browsing software instead of Internet Explorer.169  On appeal, 
the D.C. Circuit Court weighed the potential impact of bundling on consumer 
demand for other competing products, and made the following observation:  
“assuming choice is available at zero cost, consumers will prefer it to no 
choice.”170   
Yet, the appellate court overturned the ordered split and disagreed as to 
the previous tying verdict, holding that although Microsoft may not “be ab-
solved of tying liability,” Microsoft was not liable under per se tying.171  On 
this basis, the court held that due to a lack of empirical evidence and mean-
ingful experience adjudicating antitrust claims within the technology space, 
the trial court incorrectly applied the per se label to Microsoft’s conduct.172  
The court remanded for the tying claim to be construed under the rule of 
reason analysis where the plaintiffs must demonstrate Microsoft’s anticom-
petitive conduct outweighed any procompetitive justifications.173 
Market definition again played a pivotal role in the Microsoft deci-
sion.174  Microsoft argued that the trial court defined the primary market too 
narrowly by examining only the worldwide market of Intel-compatible op-
erating systems and excluding other operating systems, such as Mac OS from 
Apple.175  Yet, the appellate court ultimately rejected this argument because 
consumers were unlikely to migrate from Windows OS to Mac OS due to 
                                                          
168. Id. at 84.  
169. Id. at 88.  
170. Id. at 87.  
171. Id. at 89.  
172. Id. at 94–95.  
173. Id. at 95.  
174. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  (“In appealing the district court 
holding, Microsoft made a number of arguments contesting this market definition and the inference 
that it was indicative of market power.  The first was that the market was defined too narrowly by 
virtue of excluding the Apple Computer operating system Mac OS, operating systems for non-PC 
devices like handheld units, and middleware.”).  
175. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 52.  
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high switching costs, incompatibilities between each OS, and the effort in-
volved in learning the configuration of a new OS.176  Further, the court rea-
soned that a firm cannot possess market power unless the market is also pro-
tected by “significant barriers to entry” from other competitors.177 
As discussed, Apple consumers face similar problems when changing 
their mobile devices.  Additionally, other potential competitors in either the 
iOS app distribution market or in-app payment processing market are fore-
closed from entering these markets as Apple maintains “gatekeeper power” 
over these respective markets.178  Therefore, Apple protects the market of 
iOS app distribution and in-app payment processing by using the App Store 
as the only method to distribute iOS-compatible apps.179 
This case draws a powerful distinction between Microsoft and Epic in 
that Apple, unlike Microsoft, does not provide any other choice to its con-
sumers than to use both the App Store and thus Apple’s IAP system.180  An 
iOS user, by virtue of using an iOS mobile device, must use Apple’s App 
Store and Apple’s IAP system to access to a third-party developer’s content 
and purchase digital goods.181  The Apple App Store cannot be uninstalled 
from an iOS mobile device, and a consumer cannot directly download iOS-
compatible programs from third-party developers.182  An iOS user is limited 
to what Apple permits through the App Store and thus subjects its customers 
                                                          
176. Id.  
177. Id. at 82.  
178. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.  
179. Id.  
180. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 3–4.  
181. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 342 (“Many developers have stressed that, because Apple dictates that 
the App Store is the only way to install software on iOS devices and requires apps offering “digital 
goods and services” to implement the IAP mechanism, Apple has illegally tied IAP to the App 
Store.  Consumers with iOS devices account for a disproportionately high amount of spending on 
apps—spending twice as much as Android users.”).   
182. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 3–4; see also 
Remove Built-In Apple Apps from the Home Screen on Your iOS 10 Device or Apple Watch, APPLE 
SUPPORT, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204221# [https://perma.cc/93W7-GZT8].  
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to any fees Apple ultimately imposes upon developers through its IAP sys-
tem.183   
While this new generation of technology firms rely on technology not 
anticipated by the Microsoft court, the analysis surrounding the Microsoft 
decision sheds light on limitations of antitrust regulations today.184  The Mi-
crosoft decision has been used by other courts to further carve out this “high-
tech exceptionalism” to antitrust enforcement.185  In effect, “if a tie can be 
said to improve a high-tech product in any way, the competitive effects of its 
design are beyond antitrust reproach.”186 
IV. THE FUTURE OF ANTITRUST  
“Technological tying” or “tech-tying” occurs when a firm with a dom-
inant position in one market increases interoperability with its own products 
by engaging in foreclosure of competition or leveraging.187  This phenome-
non of vertical integration in digital aftermarkets is omnipresent across all 
major tech companies, including other large companies such as Microsoft, 
Amazon, and Google.188  These firms play an integral role in the American 
digital economy, not just due to their significant and durable market power, 
but also due to the services they provide, such as communication, commerce, 
and information services that countless other industries consistently rely 
upon.189  However, the continued monopolization by these same firms has 
substantially reduced “consumer choice, eroded innovation and entrepre-
neurship in the U.S. economy, weakened the vibrancy of the free and diverse 
                                                          
183. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 4.  
184. Chris Butts, The Microsoft Case 10 Years Later: Antitrust and New Leading “New 
Economy” Firms, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 285 (2010).  
185. Rebecca H. Allensworth, Antitrust’s High-Tech Exceptionalism, 130 YALE L.J. F. 
563, 603 (2021).  
186. Id.  
187. John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 681, 683 (2012).  
188. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 287; see generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
253 F.3d 34, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
189. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 10.  
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press, and undermined Americans’ privacy.”190  Firms exploit this monopo-
listic power to gain control of other vertical markets by “establishing an in-
frastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.”191 
A. Tech-Tying, Effective Through Leveraging 
Leveraging is a broad theory within antitrust law, rather than a right of 
action itself such as tying.  Leveraging “occurs when a firm exploits its mo-
nopoly power in one market in order to extend that power to an adjacent 
market, subsequently exercising market power in that market by raising 
prices or restricting output or quality.”192  Generally, leveraging “encom-
pass[es] any form of conduct that makes it harder for third parties to distrib-
ute their products or services through a platform, while benefitting the plat-
form owner’s competing product.”193  Although the doctrine of leveraging 
has “lost substantial favor,” demonstrating a defendant’s leverage may be 
critical for plaintiffs attempting to prove a firm engaged in tech-tying.194  In 
the digital era, this manifests when platform owners pre-install their own 
software as a means of self-promotion and block other developers from cre-
ating competing products.195  Firms such as Apple create both the mobile 
device operating system and the applications that “sit on top of” its own plat-
forms.196 
This raises the question as to what exactly Apple is tying.  Apple di-
rectly controls iOS mobile app distribution through the App Store.197  By 
funneling all app downloads and purchases through the App Store, Apple 
                                                          
190. Id. at 12.  
191. Patrick F. Todd, Digital Platforms and the Leverage Problem, 98 NEB. L. REV. 486, 
522 (2019) (quoting Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407–08 (2004)).  
192. Id. at 488.  
193. Id. at 489.  
194. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 17, at § 5.02.  
195. Todd, supra note 191, at 489.  
196.  Id. at 497.  
197. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334–35.  
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can also require its consumers to use Apple’s IAP system.198  In its com-
plaint, Epic argues that Apple has unlawfully tied the App Store to Apple’s 
IAP system.199  This, however, may not capture the full scope of Apple’s 
tying conduct. 
The tying appears to be happening twofold:  first, Apple conditions the 
use of its mobile iOS operating system with the App Store as the sole means 
of iOS-compatible app distribution;200 and second, Apple ties the App Store 
to its IAP system for making app-related purchases for virtual goods.201  Ap-
ple compels the consumer to utilize its App Store without any competing 
alternatives and prohibits users from deleting the Apple App Store.202  As a 
result, Apple is able to maintain its “gatekeeper” status over the app distri-
bution market for iOS devices203 and therefore require consumers and app 
developers alike to use Apple’s IAP system.204  App developers allege that 
Apple “actively undermines the open web’s progress” on its own iOS de-
vices in order to “to push developers toward building native apps on iOS 
rather than using web technologies.”205   
Apple maintains complete control over iOS smartphones by disallow-
ing any competitors in the aftermarkets of iOS app distribution and in-app 
                                                          
198. Id. at 339 (“Apps are not permitted to. . .offer their own payment processing mecha-
nism in the app to avoid using Apple’s IAP.”).  
199. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 53.  
200. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 335.  
201. See generally Remove built-in Apple apps from the Home screen on your iOS 10 de-
vice or Apple Watch, supra note 185; see also App Store Review Guidelines, 3.2.2. Unacceptable, 
APPLE.COM (Feb. 1, 2021), https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/#in-app-pur-
chase [https://perma.cc/R7T8-R9Y9]; see also Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, 
supra note 12, at 53.  
202. See generally Remove built-in Apple apps from the Home screen on your iOS 10 device 
or Apple Watch, supra note 185; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.  
203. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334.  
204. Id. at 342.  
205. Id. at 335.  
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payment processing.206  In the U.S., Apple enjoys “significant and durable” 
market power in the smartphone, mobile operating system, and mobile app 
store markets, with more than half of all domestic smartphones running on 
Apple’s iOS.207  Globally, Apple returned to the number one position at the 
close of 2020 Q4 in the mobile device market, capturing 23.4% of the market 
share with the highest shipment volume in history by a single vendor.208  Ap-
ple thus leverages its market power in the iOS aftermarkets to require con-
sumers and third-party developers to use Apple’s App Store and subse-
quently its IAP system.209 
In the instant case, the market at issue is not the smartphone market at 
large.  Like in Kodak and Microsoft, the market in question is the aftermar-
kets of in iOS app distribution and in-app payment processing.210  Apple cre-
ates an absolute barrier to entry for third parties that either wish to distribute 
iOS-compatible apps or provide alternative payment processing systems for 
digital commerce on iOS smartphones.211  The Apple App Store’s net reve-
nue alone was estimated at $17.4 billion for the 2020 fiscal year.212  Analyt-
ics have shown that, on its own, the App Store would rank at 64 in the For-
tune 500.213  Apple also has yet to produce any evidence that its App Store 
is not the exclusive method of app distribution for iOS devices or that Apple 
does not maintain monopoly control of these aftermarkets.214   
Through its tied products, Apple exerts a “supra-competitive” 30% 
commission over developers which developers then pass on to the consumer 
                                                          
206. Id. at 334–35.  
207. Id. at 334.  
208. Smartphone Shipments Return to Positive Growth in the Fourth Quarter Driven by 
Record Performance by Apple, According to IDC, IDC (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.idc.com/get-
doc.jsp?containerId=prUS47410621 [https://perma.cc/FVE5-ZDCU].  
209. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 102, 334, 341–42.  
210. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 16, 28.  
211. See Ball, supra note 118.  
212. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 344–45.  
213. Id.  
214. Id. at 335.  
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by inflating in-app prices.215  Due to consumer lock-in and high switching 
costs, Apple may also be able to raise its commission on third-party devel-
opers without losing any meaningful consumer sales in the OEM market of 
smartphones. 
Apple argues that its 30% commission is “hardly unique” within the 
industry and compares itself to other platform owners.216  Apple invented 
this 30% standard in 2009 when the tech company began enforcing its 30% 
commission fees—a rate that has since become “the industry standard” for 
digital goods.217  Yet, the actual figure of 30% is not precisely the issue.  
Apple has reduced this 30% commission to 15% for certain “reader” or sub-
scription-based apps after its first operating year.218  Further, Apple does not 
exert the same 30% commission over purchases of physical items through 
iOS apps.219   
The issue is that Apple has unparalleled discretion to implement arbi-
trary rules or fees—the “our bat, our ball, our rules” approach220—to the det-
riment of other would-be competitors in the aftermarkets of iOS app 
                                                          
215. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 16–17 (“Apple also uses its power to exploit app developers through 
misappropriation of competitively sensitive information and to charge app developers supra-com-
petitive prices within the App Store . . .  In the absence of competition, Apple’s monopoly power 
over software distribution to iOS devices has resulted in harm to competitors and competition, 
reducing quality and innovation among app developers, and increasing prices and reducing choices 
for consumers.”); see also Nilay Patel, Apple’s App Store Fees are ‘Highway Robbery,’ says House 
Antitrust Committee Chair, VERGE (June 18, 2020, 3:21 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6
/18/21295778/apple-app-store-hey-email-fees-policies-antitrust-wwdc-2020 [https://perma.cc
/KF3Y-EUQE] (House Antitrust Committee Chair Rep. David Cicilline:  “You cannot simply allow 
someone merely because they invented a system or a product to continue to enjoy that kind of 
monopoly power . . . . It’s contrary to our laws.  It’s unfair to new developers, new startups, and it 
hurts consumers.”).  
216. Apple, Inc.’s Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 5, Epic 
Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2020).  
217. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 98.  
218. Id. at 339–41.  
219. Ball, supra note 118.  
220. Ben Lovejoy, Opinion: Apple’s Antitrust Issues Won’t Go Away; the Company Should 
Act Now, 9TO5MAC (June 17, 2020, 7:08 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2020/06/17/apples-antitrust-
issues/ [https://perma.cc/MP6T-ZDX4].  
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distribution and in-app payment processing.221  Apple’s 30% commission on 
the sale of digital goods is “non-negotiable.”222  Apple owns each adjacent 
market which relies on the former, thus leveraging its complete market 
power over these iOS aftermarkets.223  Should an app developer disagree 
with Apple’s policies, they risk losing access to over one-billion iOS us-
ers.224   
Furthermore, other competitors operate in the payment processing mar-
ket at large— and at a much cheaper price.225  It has been speculated that 
Apple’s expenses to run the App Store, when compared against the revenue 
made from the App Store, would justify charging no more than 3.65% to app 
developers.226  As one app developer suggested, Apple’s stance on the status 
of its payment system “distorts competition in payment processing by mak-
ing access to its App Store conditional on the use of [Apple’s] IAP for in-
app purchases, thus excluding alternative payment processors.”227  Like 
Epic, other developers would prefer to offer in-house payment processing 
options, as is customary with many online retailers selling physical goods.228 
B. Apple’s Anticompetitive Conduct Outweighs Any Procompetitive 
Justifications 
Like the Microsoft case, Epic urged the court to evaluate Apple’s tying 
under the per se approach or, in the alternative, under the rule of reason 
                                                          
221. Ball, supra note 118 (“[Apple] is inhibiting this future Internet.  And it does so via 
tolls, controls, and technologies that not only deny what made and still makes the open web so 
powerful, but also prevents competition, and prioritize Apple’s own profits.”).  
222. Id.  
223. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 16-17; see also Patel, supra note 215.   
224. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 3.  
225. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8.  
226. Id. (“Other developers have noted that alternative payment processing providers 
charge significantly lower rates than Apple’s fee for IAP.  Match Group estimates that Apple’s 
expenses related to payment processing ‘justify charging no more than 3.65% of revenue.’”).  
227. Id. at 343.  
228. Id. at 346.  
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analysis.229  Under a rule of reason analysis, Epic would also have to demon-
strate “the anticompetitive effects of tying . . . [outweigh] the procompetitive 
justifications for the arrangement.”230  In response, Apple asserts its conduct 
should be protected from redress under antitrust laws due to Apple’s “legit-
imate business justifications.”231  Apple claimed that its conduct was reason-
able “at all times” and “undertaken in good faith to advance legitimate busi-
ness interests and had the effect of promoting, encouraging, and increasing 
competition.”232   
Apple presents various justifications for its conduct, such as the claim 
that linking its app store to its iOS is a “product-design decision,” meant to 
protect its “integrated tech ecosystem.”233  Apple also argues that it uses the 
App Store as a security measure to protect its users from any potentially ma-
licious apps by thoroughly vetting all apps it permits in the App Store.234  
Additionally, Apple characterizes its 30% fee as a commission or distribu-
tion fee, rather than a payment processing fee, insisting that the fee “reflects 
the value of the App Store as a channel for the distribution of developers’ 
apps and the cost of many services” incurred by Apple to maintain the App 
Store.235  Apple further asserts that it maintains control over the App Store 
to ensure that all iOS apps are up to Apple’s “high standards for privacy, 
security, content, and quality.”236  Apple’s rationale for this 30% fee has also 
evolved over time.237  For example, back in 2011, Apple CFO Peter Oppen-
heimer claimed the fee charged by the App Store was implemented to ensure 
                                                          
229. See Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 54.  
230. Piraino, Jr., supra note 88, at 104.  
231. Apple, Inc.’s Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims, supra note 127, at 36.  
232. Id. 
233. Allensworth, supra note 185, at 603.  
234. Apple, Inc.’s Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 217, 
at 5.  
235. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 343.  
236. Apple, Inc.’s Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims, supra note 127, at 4.  
237. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 344.  
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that Apple received “just a little over break even” in exchange for operating 
the App Store.238   
However, Epic noted in its Complaint that Apple fails to exert similar 
control over its personal computers.239  Apple’s MacBook users are free to 
download programs outside of the Apple-controlled App Store and can make 
direct purchases outside of the IAP system.240 Consumers can still access 
Fortnite through their Apple computers, without having to route through the 
Apple App Store to download the game or use Apple’s IAP system to pur-
chase any virtual goods.241  This indicates that the alleged privacy concerns 
Apple raises extend only to its mobile devices and not its personal comput-
ers.  Apple also does not impose its typical 30% commission for the purchase 
of physical goods,242 suggesting that this fee operates more arbitrarily than 
Apple claims.   
Kodak similarly argued its tying arrangement was justified for the fol-
lowing reasons:  “(1) to promote inter-brand equipment competition by al-
lowing Kodak to stress the quality of its service; (2) to improve asset man-
agement by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs; and (3) to prevent ISOs from 
free-riding on Kodak’s capital investment in equipment, parts and ser-
vice.”243  Yet, the Court rejected Kodak’s justifications, calling attention to 
Kodak’s inconsistent actions and failure to provide adequate evidence to 
supports its alleged justifications.244  As in Kodak, Apple’s justifications 
likely do not outweigh the anticompetitive nature of Apple’s conduct.  Ap-
ple, in allowing such freedom on its other devices, demonstrates Apple can 
financially afford to allow competing iOS app distributors, and that data pri-
vacy concerns are not a legitimate business justification. 
                                                          
238. Id.  
239. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 6.  
240. Id. at 22.  
241. Id. at 6.  
242. Ball, supra note 118.  
243. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992).  
244. Id. at 484–85.  
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C. Shifting the Antitrust Paradigm 
Accordingly, both the iOS app distribution and in-app payment pro-
cessing are two distinct markets, even if Apple’s products are functionally 
linked.  Therefore, presently or on appeal, the Court should find that Apple 
has unlawfully conditioned the use of its iOS platforms to its App Store, and 
thus to its IAP system.  Apple owns both the hardware, the iPhone, and the 
operating system, iOS, and thus conditions the operability of Apple’s own 
apps and all third-party apps on the use of Apple’s App Store to operate the 
mobile device as a whole.245  Apple goes a step further to exert additional 
control over any in-app sales of digital goods by tying its IAP system to its 
App Store, the sole means of app distribution for iOS devices.246  Each step 
in this vertical chain represents distinct markets: the smartphone market, the 
iOS app distribution market, and the iOS in-app payment processing market.  
Apple uses its market dominance in the iOS mobile device market to unfairly 
leverage and ultimately control the aftermarkets of both iOS app distribution 
and in-app payment processing.247  Apple’s market power may manifest in a 
variety of ways, such as “lower quality, lower privacy protection, less crea-
tion of new business/entry, less variety of political viewpoints, and, im-
portantly, less investments in innovation.”248 
The courts should seek a balance between promoting fair market struc-
tures and protecting the right of technology companies to exert control over 
their product by extending antitrust protection to entrepreneurs and inde-
pendent businesses.249  In the absence of retroactively splitting monopolistic 
tech companies, courts should scrutinize a company’s potential threat of ver-
tical integration and how a company may leverage this power in aftermar-
kets.  By moving away from “high-tech exceptionalism,” the courts should 
reject the Microsoft rationale that improving a high-tech product grants a 
                                                          
245. Epic Games, Inc.’s Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 12, at 53.  
246. Id.; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 342. 
247. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 334–46.  
248. STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS, GEORGE J. STIGLER CTR. FOR THE 
STUDY OF THE ECON. AND ST., FINAL REPORT, 8 (2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/me-
dia/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms—-committee-report—-stigler-center.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8CMP-W8Q7].  
249. Id. at 392.  
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firm reprieve from antitrust enforcement.250  The courts should thus abandon 
the short-sighted, consumer-centered paradigm of antitrust, opting instead to 
examine the “competitive process itself” by scrutinizing both the structure 
of the firm and the relevant markets.251  In finding for Epic, the Court here 
would demonstrate that tech firms cannot evade meaningful antitrust en-
forcement where their conduct hinders competition. 
Given the confused state of current law, it would benefit the courts if 
Congress were to provide clarity through legislation.  Among other things, 
the legislature should direct courts to protect competition in addition to con-
sumers when adjudicating antitrust claims.  In strengthening scrutiny of ver-
tical restraints, the legislature can make this clear:  tech-tying is anticompet-
itive conduct.  While the courts may be slow to clarify antitrust 
jurisprudence, legislative changes would offer “faster and more certain” path 
to antitrust enforcement against the emerging trend of tech-tying.252  As an 
increasing number of U.S. markets are controlled by a shrinking number of 
firms, the legislature must act now to implement antitrust reform.253 
D. Looking Forward 
 The same day Epic filed suit against Apple, Apple announced its plans 
to launch “AppleOne,” a product that will bundle their existing services of 
streaming, music, iCloud storage, news and much more.254  As a consumer, 
the prospect of finally combining all streaming services may be exciting, as 
it will allow many to cut down on various virtual subscriptions.  Apple will 
offer a way to streamline and simplify this process, for seemingly less 
money.255  Consequently, it may be difficult to imagine how restricting Ap-
ple would benefit the consumer when Apple brings remarkable convenience 
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to our lives.  However, this again raises the central issue—how much control 
should Apple be allowed to exert?  A $2 trillion market cap company is un-
precedented,256 as is the technology at consumers’ fingertips. 
Since the filing of Epic’s lawsuit, other companies such as Spotify 
Technology SA and Match Group Inc. have joined Epic against these tech 
giants by creating the Coalition For App Fairness.257  The Coalition’s mis-
sion is to promote “fair treatment by these app stores and the platform owners 
who operate them.”258  As “Big Tech” companies clash with smaller third-
party developers, the courts and legislature will face an increasing need for 
clear guidance on how best to navigate complex antitrust issues.  The legis-
lature must also enact reforms to antitrust laws to account for the growing 
phenomenon of tech-tying and clarify the confusing standards for analyzing 
tying claims, both within and beyond technological markets.259   
V. CONCLUSION 
Epic should prevail on its claims of tying against Apple.  While Apple 
has every right to operate its own App Store and offer services exclusive to 
its devices, Apple cannot be permitted to continue this “forced bundling.”260  
The solution is clear: allow iOS users to download iOS-compatible apps 
from other sources and allow app developers to use alternative payment pro-
cessing systems.261  This does not preclude Apple from offering both its own 
App Store as a means of iOS app distribution and Apple’s IAP system as an 
in-app payment mechanism.  Both may serve as competing options for iOS 
users. 
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However, Epic will face significant hurdles due to the current judicial 
hostility toward antitrust262 and inconsistent tying jurisprudence.263  Epic is 
hardly alone in experiencing Apple’s anti-competitive behavior and consum-
ers may have little hope in overcoming the steep cost of switching platforms.  
Absent any meaningful intervention by the legislature to also codify laws 
prohibiting the practice of tech-tying in digital aftermarkets, Apple and other 
“Big Tech” firms’ conduct may remain entirely unchecked. 
This result may be counter-intuitive to our sense of intellectual property 
rights and conflict with deregulatory free-market ideology.  It is true that 
Apple creates technology that many consider essential to our daily lives.  
You may be reading this Comment on your MacBook or scrolling on your 
iPhone.  However, the “our bat, our ball, our rules” 264 mentality of high-tech 
firms will inevitably leave consumers, entrepreneurs, and other smaller com-
panies vulnerable.  Unregulated capitalism has consistently trended toward 
the formation of monopolistic firms with incredible power to wield over con-
sumers and competitors alike.265  In order for healthy competition to thrive, 
fair conditions must be maintained and cultivated through both the courts 
and the legislature to prevent further monopolization in high-tech markets. 
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